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Dostoevsky and the Meaning of Suffering

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satadru
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“maybe”
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Epic Fail

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This weekend my daughter went to continue reading an ebook she has available to her from her public elementary school on the Epic Reading Platform.

When she went to advance to the next page she was presented with an error message saying that the book was only available during school hours, and she would need to subscribe for $9.99/month.

If you still remember physical textbooks, can you imagine being forced to pay a company a monthly fee to bring your textbook home on the weekend?

I’ve emailed the principal of the school to voice my opinion that it is inappropriate for our school system to susbcribe to an ebook vendor that is trying to extract money from students. I believe it is also an equity issue since some families are able to spend $9.99/month on a service like this, and others are not. The playing field is not level, not by accident, but by design.

I thought that this might fit in with The Markup’s investigation into the ed-tech industry, but I guess it doesn’t really fit because it’s not a privacy issue per se. It is pretty infuriating though…the whole promise of ebooks is that they theoretically broaden access, but here access is being intentionally limited in order to make a profit. This doesn’t fit the goals of public education.

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satadru
103 days ago
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J F C.
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acdha
122 days ago
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Edtech is full of people who see children primarily as revenue streams
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satadru
103 days ago
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mareino
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Hail Caesar’s

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Editor’s note: We’re celebrating Mushroom Week at Culinary Backstreets, and today’s installment takes us to Istanbul’s Belgrade Forest, where Turkey’s leading wild mushroom expert has found some remarkable fungus specimens.

“This would be front-page news in France!” Jilber raved, darting off between tall chestnut trees and oaks, obscured by a hazy steam that seemed to hang in the forest like a gauzy Halloween decoration. He looked over each shoulder and all around him where it seemed he was surrounded by golf balls, shanked off and forgotten in the rough. Called ovoli to admirers in Italy, Amanita caesarea to the bookish, and yumurta, or egg, in Turkish, these were Caesar’s mushrooms, named for their popularity with the Roman emperors. Gathered together in the damp, brown leaves were a couple of long-stemmed, large-capped mushrooms as big as dinner plates, their tops beginning to flatten. Beside were smaller bulbous ones of the same family that evoked clown noses, while among the brush were caps just beginning to emerge from their white “shell.” Our expedition of four, led by Jilber Barutçiyan, Turkey’s leading wild mushroom expert, froze and took in the marvel of this forager’s treasure trove.

“Last year, if I found just one Caesar, I’d do a belly dance!” said Jilber.

Muhteşem,” said Mehmet, the photographer of this expedition, in a slow drawl. Marvelous. “I’ll take a video.”

Magnifique,” said Jean Renee, one of our companions, pointing out more “eggs” with his umbrella.

And then, Jilber (pronounced “Jeel-bear”), unable to contain himself, raised his arms and did a little Anatolian shimmy, hopping in green rubber boots among the mushrooms. After Mehmet had filmed each mushroom, the giddy group of men flipped open their knives and began plucking them from the ground, snuggling them into their baskets.

It was cause for celebration. Even for those unappreciative of most fungal nuances, these Caesars – found in Istanbul’s Belgrade Forest, an oasis of green on the city’s northern edge crisscrossed by Ottoman-era dams and aqueducts – were something to behold. A bold orange cap concealing delicate gills and a trunk that looked to be bathed in saffron: Unlike the fragile chanterelles we’d found down the path or the clunky spongy porcini in our baskets, the Caesar struck a, well, imperial pose. Eating them raw, fresh from the ground, we thought we identified the nutty taste that Jilber detailed in his entry on this specimen in his book Türkiye’nin Mantarları (The Mushrooms of Turkey), published, sadly, only in Turkish. But perhaps more than the properties of the mushroom itself, the sensation of finding such a forager’s trophy in such abundance was euphoric.

Whereas in Switzerland, the sight of such a stash might set off a bidding war, or in Russia a fistfight, onlookers in one nearby village were roundly skeptical about our mushrooms. One hairnetted kitchen worker on a smoke break related that his grandfather fell gravely ill from eating mushrooms. He wouldn’t come near our baskets. An inquisitive woman craned her neck from a distance and waved off the offer of one fine mushroom as a gift. A taxi driver plucked one from our basket and asked us what were those things. Painted Easter eggs? Mushrooms, we explained. Allah Allah, he said, and walked off. All of these people, presumably, live within shouting distance of one of Europe’s finest and least-known mushroom hunting grounds and they kept a wide berth, as if we were handling radioactive material.

That’s not to say that wild mushrooms aren’t eaten or sold in Istanbul. At the İnebolu Pazarı in the Dolapdere neighborhood, which specializes in goods from the Black Sea region, known as fertile ground for mushrooms, they are the star attraction. But on a recent visit, we found a basket of Caesars that looked like they’d been dragged all the way from Kastamonu in a wet paper bag. They were nearly all limp and broken, totally filthy. “Fifteen lira per kilo if you want to choose, five if you don’t!” barked the vendor. Had these mushrooms been picked and transported carefully to the market in, say, Barcelona, they’d fetch upwards of €80 per kilo.

The general lack of interest in mushrooms means that a supply chain has never developed between the abundant forests just to the north of the city and the throngs of restaurants downtown. Indeed, the only mushrooms that turn up in Istanbul’s traditional restaurants are rather pedestrian button mushrooms, which are not cooked or eaten with much enthusiasm. Kaan Sakarya, chef of Nicole, said he’ll serve a wild mushroom dish only “on Jilber’s word,” meaning he gets a phone call that his friend has stumbled on something interesting in the forest.

In the kitchen, Kaan showed us a stash of Caesar’s mushrooms Jilber had just dropped off. He melted down plenty of butter and gently sautéed the chopped mushrooms, pointing out the saffron-colored juice released. “It’s almost like egg yolk,” he said, stirring until it set, “or like a menemen!” The dish would be part of the night’s tasting menu, a precious treat on a Wednesday night, not to be swooned over again until Jilber’s next call came in.

With Istanbul’s endless appetite for gourmet pizza and a fine-dining culture refocusing on the fruits of Anatolian soil, the lack of interest in wild mushrooms seems likely to change. Oddly, the man best positioned to profit, Jilber, the king of Istanbul’s Caesars, has no interest in the business. He forages every day and shares his findings with his friends for free.

“Education is my number one goal,” he said.

So Jilber, a former bar owner who learned about mushrooms during a 20-year stay in Switzerland, is basically starting from scratch, trying to put in place a culture of mushroom hunting where it has never really existed. He’s started a club called the Mushroom Friends. He takes groups of schoolchildren out in the forest whenever he is asked. He’ll lecture anyone on the subject who cares to learn something. But he is not so concerned with the fortunes that could be made from his coveted knowledge. He knows more than a little about truffles in these parts but shies away from the subject. “They’d be in here with bulldozers tomorrow,” he said. The edible findings occupy only a small part of Jilber’s interests.

We trailed off the path, passing up dozens of Caesars, finally arriving at the true reason for the day’s hunt. There it was, Hericium coralloides (coral tooth fungus), the biggest and finest example Jilber had ever seen. Covering the end of a rotting log, the white fungus looked like the inside of a freezer with a serious frost problem. Nothing you’d eat, but a big score for Jilber’s research. Mehmet set up his tripod.

“I could spend all day here,” Mehmet said.

Jilber excitedly made a couple of phone calls about the finding and then stomped off into the woods. He knew a spot where we might see a fungus clinging to the side of a tree that looked a lot like a human ear. And off we went.

This article was originally published on October 22, 2014.

The post Hail Caesar’s appeared first on Culinary Backstreets.

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satadru
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hannahdraper
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The President’s Mystery

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Franklin Roosevelt was a voracious reader of crime novels. “Hundreds are published every year, but even in the good ones, there is a sameness,” he complained over lunch to Liberty Magazine editor Fulton Oursler one day in 1935. “Someone finds the corpse, and then the detective tracks down the murderer.”

Oursler asked him whether he had any better ideas. He did: “How can a man disappear with five million dollars of his own money in negotiable form and not be traced?” Roosevelt said he had carried that question in his mind for years but had not solved it himself.

The editor knew a marketable idea when he heard one, and he recruited six of the period’s top mystery writers to work on a chain novel that appeared serially in the magazine beginning that November. (The writers were Rupert Hughes, Samuel Hopkins Adams, Anthony Abbott, Rita Weiman, S.S. Van Dine, and John Erskine.)

A year later the story was made into a film, above, with the memorable credit “Story Conceived by Franklin D. Roosevelt.” FDR remains the only president to earn a film-writing credit while in office.

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satadru
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Wirecutter

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This was always going to be a controversial Wirecutter post, but what really got them in trouble were their 'budget' and 'upgrade' picks.
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satadru
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Alt txt FTW...
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mareino
206 days ago
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The alt text is gold: "This was always going to be a controversial Wirecutter post, but what really got them in trouble were their 'budget' and 'upgrade' picks."
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mkalus
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iPhone: 49.287476,-123.142136
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Much of what you've heard about Carter and Reagan is wrong

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If you, like me, grew up in the United States of America, you’ve probably heard a story of the late 1970s and early 1980s that goes something like this: “In the 70s, Carter’s liberal big-government policies resulted in runaway inflation. Reagan came in and defeated inflation, and produced an economic boom with deregulation and tax cuts. Reagan also embarked on a massive defense spending binge which, although it increased the deficit a lot, forced the USSR to bankrupt itself trying to keep up, and thus won the Cold War.”

That might sound like a straw man, but the narratives we tell each other about the past often consist of exactly such straw men. And debunking those narratives might feel like shooting at easy targets, but it’s helpful for taking a closer look at history.

Anyway, the above narrative is almost entirely wrong. Carter was a deregulator who didn’t increase deficits much, and appointed the Fed chair who beat inflation. Reagan didn’t do much deregulating, nor did he increase defense spending much as a share of GDP — and the USSR didn’t fall because of the arms race. Let’s go through these points one by one.

1) Carter was the one who beat inflation.

Most economists believe that sustained inflation, such as what we saw in the 70s, is the result of some combination of loose monetary policy and fiscal deficits. In the 70s, the Fed probably did run loose monetary policy, contributing to the inflation of that period. This ended under Paul Volcker, who raised interest rates until people realized that the Fed no longer tolerated high inflation. This came at a great cost — two sharp recessions.

But it was Jimmy Carter who appointed Volcker as the Fed chair, in 1979. Volcker was appointed specifically to do this job, as he was known as an inflation hawk, and Carter recognized inflation as America’s biggest economic problem. Volcer hiked interest rates all the way up to 17.61% under Carter, causing the first of the two Volcker Recessions in 1980.

That recession probably contributed to Carter’s loss. The fact that Carter knew taming inflation would probably cause a recession shows how seriously he took the problem.

But did Carter contribute to the inflation with loose fiscal policy? Hardly. He inherited a modest deficit from his predecessor, Gerald Ford, and kept it at about the same level throughout his presidency:

He also didn’t change spending much.

So Carter’s deficits were much smaller than Reagan’s in the 80s. That suggests that fiscal deficits were not really what was driving inflation in the 70s (since deficits rose and inflation fell under Reagan). Instead, it was monetary policy, which tightened thanks to Carter’s appointment of an inflation hawk. Reagan, of course, gets partial credit here for keeping Volcker on for a while (before eventually firing him). But Carter is the one who did the heavy lifting here, taking the risk of a recession in an election year — which might have been part of what did him in.

2) Carter was the Great Deregulator, not Reagan.

Reagan campaigned on promises of deregulation, and he appointed people to regulatory agencies who tended to use a light touch. But when it comes to actual deregulatory policies implemented, Carter did substantially more than Reagan. He deregulated airlines, energy, trucking, railways, telecommunications, finance, and more.

Don’t take my word for it — take it from the libertarian Foundation for Economic Education!

Carter gets a very bad rap, particularly from libertarians and conservatives, but it's not entirely clear why…Carter's most lasting legacy is as the Great Deregulator. Carter deregulated oil, trucking, railroads, airlines, and beer.

The libertarian magazine Reason, another inveterate opponent of regulation, concurs:

Reason has never been shy about praising Jimmy Carter for his role in deregulating airline ticket pricing and interstate trucking (and beer!). Over at AOL News, B. Kelly Eakin and Mark E. Meitzen remind us of [the Staggers Rail Act], a third  transportation-related deregulation success that Carter pushed.

Much of Carter’s deregulatory agenda came from the people he appointed. For example, there was Alfred E. Kahn, an economist whom Carter appointed to chair the Civil Aeronautics Board. Kahn was a hardcore deregulator, testifying to Congress that “The superiority of open markets…lies in the fact that the optimum outcome cannot be predicted.” Many of his other appointees had similar ideas. The administration was so deregulation-minded that it even discussed systematic limitation of regulation as a permanent policy:

In 1980, President Carter’s Economic Report of the President discussed proposals to “develop a ‘regulatory budget,’ similar to the expenditure budget, as a framework for looking at the total financial burden imposed by regulations, for setting some limits to this burden, and for making tradeoffs within those limits.

How about Reagan? Despite his fiery rhetoric, Reagan during his two terms in office managed to pass only two pieces of legislation that make it onto Wikipedia’s list of significant deregulations — deregulating buses and savings & loans (oops). Carter, during his one term in office, passed seven major pieces of deregulatory legislation. Here’s Wikipedia’s list:

Much of Carter’s deregulation came toward the very end of his presidency, so Americans didn’t really feel the effects til Reagan was in office. This, in addition to campaign rhetoric and partisan stereotypes, might be why Reagan is generally remembered as the Great Deregulator. Really, it was Carter.

3) Reagan didn’t increase defense spending by much.

A lot of people on both sides of the political isle think Reagan embarked on a giant peacetime defense spending boom, forcing the USSR to bankrupt itself trying to keep up. To evaluate this claim, I’ll rely on some graphs from the excellent Jose Luis Ricon. In dollar terms, Reagan certainly did boost military budgets:

But note when Soviet spending rose and fell. It soared during the 1970s, rose only slightly through Reagan’s first term in office, and then began to plunge. This seems to cut against the narrative that the USSR was striving to keep up with the U.S. If anything, it suggests that Reagan’s buildup was a reaction to a Soviet buildup that had begun under Carter!

Anyway, though, when we look at Reagan’s defense buildup as a percentage of GDP, it looks much less impressive:

Historically, this looks like small potatoes. Of course, it was peacetime, and the (proportionally) far bigger military outlays of earlier decades had been for the purpose of fighting wars. But this was a surprisingly low price tag for facing down a rival superpower! And though the Soviet data is spotty, you can see that they by no means bankrupted themselves matching Reagan’s defense spending; their outlays were proportionally far lower than they had managed during World War 2, and fell during Reagan’s term in office.

So this is another historical narrative that has clearly been exaggerated.

4) The fall of the USSR is more complicated.

So did Reagan actually win the Cold War? The fall of a superpower like the USSR is a very complex phenomenon, and it’s hard to give a definitive answer to why the U.S. actually won the Cold War. I’m certainly no expert in Soviet history or politics. But the most convincing economic explanation I’ve heard for the Soviet collapse in the late 80s comes from Yegor Gaidar, a Soviet official who later became Prime Minister of Russia. In his 2007 book Collapse of an Empire, Gaidar tells the story of how the USSR gradually transitioned from a sclerotic manufacturing-based economy to a sclerotic petrostate. When oil prices collapsed in the oil glut that began around 1985, the rigid Soviet economy — which has also over-regulated trade, agriculture, and a bunch of other stuff — collapsed right along with them.

But why did oil prices crash? Essentially, the oil shocks of the 1970s caused a lot of non-OPEC producers to increase production and/or exploration, resulting in a delayed but massive increase in supply. The U.S. was not a big part of this — despite the completion of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System in 1977, and executive orders by Carter in 1979 and Reagan in 1981 deregulating oil prices, U.S. production rose only a tiny bit:

The energy glut that dealt the USSR its final economic deathblow came not from anything America did, but from the actions of a bunch of other countries — the UK, Brazil, India, Egypt, Oman, Malaysia, and so on.

Militarily, though, it’s worth pointing out that the USSR’s big military defeat came in Afghanistan. And though that war lasted until 1989, the crucial initial decision to arm the Soviets’ mujahideen opponents came from — you guessed it — Jimmy Carter.

So in terms of ending the Cold War, Reagan mainly held a course that Carter had initiated — arm the USSR’s opponents, boost oil production, and issue moral condemnations of the USSR while engaging in arms limitation talks with it at the same time.

What are the lessons here?

So what do we learn from the misunderstandings surrounding these two Presidents? One lesson, obviously, is that the narratives we tell about history are largely constructed after the fact, by actors who have a stake in painting a certain picture of the recent past. But another is that successful policy takes a long time to work. Carter deregulated, appointed a tough inflation-fighter to the Fed, and funded the USSR’s military opponents. But it wasn’t until the 80s that the economy boomed, inflation came down, and the USSR weakened and fell. In 1980, when Reagan beat Carter for the presidency, it still looked as if nothing was working and everything was still going wrong — even though the crucial policy steps that would turn things around had already been largely taken.

Another lesson, I think, is that American policy is driven less by ideology and presidential personality than we think. There was far more continuity than rupture between Carter and Reagan. (And we’re re-learning this lesson now, watching Biden continue Trump’s trade war, his hawkish approach to China, and even some of his restrictive immigration policies, while leaving much of his tax reform untouched.) We Americans tend to act as if every presidential election is a cataclysm that will determine the fate of the nation, and occasionally this is true — but usually, there’s probably less at stake than we think.


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mareino
204 days ago
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This matches my experience as a bureaucrat as well. Our regulation of the interstate transportation markets was utterly transformed by Carter in 1977 & 1978. Oil, gas, trucks, planes, you name it. But aside from the infamous air traffic controller strike, nothing major happened again until Bush I.
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satadru
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